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Abstract 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is developed here in a very general setting. First, 
its symbolic or algebraic part is discussed as a body of arguments which contains an allocation 
of support and an allowment of possibility for each hypothesis. It is shown how such bodies 
of arguments arise in the theory of hints and in assumption-based reasoning in logic. A rule of 
combination of bodies of arguments is then defined which constitutes the symbolic counterpart of 
Dempster’s rule. Bodies of evidence are next introduced by assigning probabilities to arguments. 
This leads to support and plausibility functions on some measurable hypotheses. As expected in 
Dempster-Shafer theory, they are shown to be set functions, monotone or alternating of infinite 
order, respectively. It is shown how these support and plausibility functions can be extended to 
all hypotheses. This constitutes then the numerical part of evidence theory. Finally, combination 
of evidence based on the combination of bodies of arguments is discussed and a generalized 
version of Dempster’s rule is derived. The approach to evidence theory proposed is general and 
is not limited to finite frames. 
0. Introduction 
Evidence theory has been introduced by Shafer [22] essentially as an axiomatic 
theory of belief tin&ions. Another axiomatic approach to belief functions has been 
proposed by Smets [27]. Evidence theory and belief functions have also been equiv- 
alently defined on the base of probabilistic models, originally by Dempster [4] using 
multivalued mappings, by Nguyen [19] based on random sets and by Kohlas [I I], 
Kohlas and Monney [ 151 as a theory of hints. On the other hand, Laskey and Lehner 
[ 171, Pearl [20], Provan [21] and Kohlas [lo] showed that evidence theory can also be 
seen as a theory of the probability of provability of hypotheses by uncertain assump- 
tions or arguments. Kohlas [12] finally pointed out that there is a qualitative version 
of evidence theory based on the latter approach, which uses neither probabilities nor 
other numerical degrees of uncertainty. 
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This last point of view is the starting point of this paper. It will be generalized 
and developed as a general mathematical foundation, first of a qualitative theory of 
evidence. Only in a second step probability measures will be introduced, leading to 
a numerical theory of evidence. This foundation will cover general frames, not only 
finite ones as in most papers so far. In this respect, this paper is a continuation of 
the first attempt of a general theory of evidence by Shafer [23] and of the sub- 
sequent work on evidence theory on general frames [ 19,9, 11, 151. The purpose of 
this paper is to put evidence theory into a general framework which covers differ- 
ent special theories and allows thus to treat them from a unified point of view. This 
should contribute to a better understanding of evidence theory, both with respect to 
its semantics as to its mathematical structure, and that is the main purpose of the 
paper. 
Assumption-based reasoning is a way to treat uncertainty. Arguments for and against 
hypotheses are derived by some inference mechanism. In the first part of this paper the 
essence of assumption-based reasoning is abstracted in a basic and general algebraic 
structure, called allocation of support, and related notions. This leads to the concept of a 
body of arguments, which is a structure representing a piece of uncertain knowledge or 
information. The first part of paper is devoted to the study of these algebraic structures. 
Two examples, namely hints and propositional assumption-based knowledge bases, are 
used to illustrate how such structures may arise in practice. 
There are some basic operations to be performed upon bodies of arguments. The 
information in different bodies of arguments need to be combined into a combined 
body. The focus of the analysis may also be coarsened or extended and refined. These 
operations will be defined and studied. 
In the second part of the paper, probabilities are assigned to the arguments. This leads 
then to probabilistic bodies of arguments or bodies of evidence. Argument algebras are 
replaced by probability algebras and the allocations of support become allocations of 
probability. The algebraic structure however is maintained such that the results of part 
one carry over. 
Allocations of probability permit to define numerical degrees of support of hypothe- 
ses. This leads to support functions and the related notion of plausibility functions. It 
turns out that these functions are monotonic (or alternating) of infinite degree (Theorem 
2.1) and satisfy thus the conditions imposed on belief functions in Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence. Therefore, the theory presented here qualifies as a Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence. 
Of particular importance are (stochastically) independent bodies of evidence. The 
combination of independent bodies of evidence corresponds to Dempster’s rule. How- 
ever, it should be noted that in general there does not exist a basic probability assign- 
ment (bpa) as it does in the case of finite frames. Therefore, neither Dempster’s rule 
nor the support (or belief) functions can be expressed in terms of bpa’s as one is used 
to [22]. The allocation of probability is the more general notion which plays the role 
of bpa in general. Also independence of bodies of evidence is not always to be taken 
for granted, as is illustrated by the case of assumption-based knowledge bases. 
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This paper is an continuation of [13]. Whereas there the frame of discernment was 
fixed, it is dynamic here in the sense that the focus of the discussion can be changed. 
It is this extension which permits to put the theory of bodies of arguments or evidence 
into the framework of the valuation networks of Shenoy, Shafer [25] (see also [24]). 
This last aspect has yet to be developed. 
1. Bodies of arguments 
1.1. Allocation of support and allowrnent of possibility 
The theory of evidence is concerned with the representation of both incomplete 
and uncertain information relative to certain questions. Hypotheses can be formulated 
about the possible answers to these questions. These hypotheses are the first elements 
one is interested in. The knowledge available may permit to construct arguments in 
favour of and against those hypotheses. But in general there is not enough informa- 
tion to assure these arguments. They are only to be considered as possible and the 
possibility that certain arguments may prove not to be valid is not excluded. That is 
why arguments in favour of and arguments against a hypothesis may be considered 
simultaneously. These arguments are the second elements of the theory to be devel- 
oped. 
In talking about hypotheses it is desirable to be able to talk about the negation of a 
hypothesis. The negation of a hypothesis should also be a valuable hypothesis. In the 
same vein, if several hypotheses are considered, it should be possible to consider the 
question if all or at least one of these hypotheses be true. Therefore, it is sensible to 
assume that these hypotheses form a Boolean algebra, denoted by % (this assumption 
can be relaxed in some contexts, but this leads then to a less complete theory, see 
[ 1, 131). By the same consideration, if a is an argument, then its negation should also 
be an argument (if the argument does not hold, then its negation holds necessarily), also 
the conjunction and disjunction of two or several arguments should be an argument. 
So, arguments should also form a Boolean algebra, denoted by &‘. For arguments it 
will even be assumed that the algebra is complete. This means that the conjunction 
and disjunction of arbitrary (not only finite or countable) families of arguments exist 
and belong to ,&‘. Conjunction (meet), disjunction (join) and negation (complement) 
will be denoted by V, A and c, respectively, except in cases of Boolean fields of 
subsets, where the usual symbols n and U for intersection and union are used. The 
zero element is denoted by -L (the empty set by G? in the case of fields) and the unit 
element (the full set) by T. The partial order relation in the Boolean algebra will 
be denoted by < or >, (C_ and > in the case of fields). The reader is referred to 
the books of Sikorski [26] and Halmos [8] for accounts on the theory of Boolean 
algebras. 
Let us note for later reference that the following associative and distributive laws 
hold always in a complete Boolean algebra. 
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Lemma 1.1. [8,26] In a complete Boolean algebra G! the following identities hold: 
De Morgan: If {ai} IS an arbitrary family of elements of &, then 
(yai)’ = !a:, (?Q)’ = !a:. 
Associative law: If {I/} is a family of sets with union I, then 
Distributive laws: if {ai} and {aj} are arbitrary families of elements of d, then 
aA Va, ( > = VCa A ai), i i (yaj) A (val) =~(a~ Aaj). 
It is assumed that knowledge is available which allows to allocate to every hypoth- 
esis some arguments in the sense that these arguments imply the hypothesis they are 
allocated to. Thereby implication means that, given some knowledge, the hypothesis 
is true if one of the arguments allocated is true. More precisely, assume that, given 
some knowledge, for any hypothesis b E 9? there is a least specific, largest argument 
p(b) E d which implies b, such that all a <p(b) also imply b, but no other a E ~2 
implies b. We impose the following conditions on p: 
(1) P(T) = T, 
(1’) P(l) = -L 
(2) p(bi A 62) = p(bl) A p(bz). 
A mapping p : 93 + d which satisfies conditions (1) and (2) is called an allocution 
of support and the triple (&,4?, p) a body of arguments. An allocation of support 
which additionally satisfies condition (1’) and the corresponding body of arguments 
will be called normalized. 
The intuitive justification of these conditions is as follows: 
(1) The sure hypothesis T should be implied by every argument because this hy- 
pothesis is always true. 
(1’) The impossible hypothesis I should be implied only by the impossible argument 
I, because this argument, according to the conventions of logic, implies everything. 
However, condition (1’) will not always be required. That is, we may well admit 
that there are arguments different from -L which imply I, p(l) > J_ (however we 
exclude that p(l) = T). In this case p will be called nonnormalized. Arguments 
implying the impossible will be called contradictions. Contradictions are arguments 
which are not consistent with the knowledge defining the allocation of support. They 
can be considered as proved to be impossible by this knowledge. A nonnormalized 
body of arguments (-Pe, 93, p) can always be normalized by replacing d by the algebra 
~2’ = d A p’(I) which is the algebra of all elements a’ = a A p’(I) with a E ~2. 
The mapping p’(b) = p(b) A p’(I) f rom B into &’ is then a normalized allocation of 
support, as is easily seen. 
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(2) Any argument for bl A b2 should also be an argument for both, bi and bz. 
Inversely, any argument which implies both bl and b2 should also imply bl A bl. 
Axiom (2) implies monotonicity 
(3) 61 db2 * p(bl)bp(bz) 
and superadditivity 
(4) p(bl V b2)3p(bt) V p(bz). 
These properties of p are easy to prove. bl < b2 is, by definition, equivalent to 61 = 
h, A bl. Therefore, (2) implies p(bt) =p(b, A bz)=p(bl) A (h2) which is equivalent 
to p(bl ) < p(b2), hence monotonicity (3). For any hypotheses 61, bl, we have bi < bl V 
hr(i = 1,2). Therefore, monotonicity implies p(bi) <p(bl V b2)(i = 1,2) from which 
p(hl) V p(bl)<p(b, V b2) follows immediately, hence superadditivity (4). 
Monotonicity means that if a hypothesis 6, is contained in another one b2, that is if 
hl implies bl, then all arguments implying bl also imply bz. Superadditivity signifies 
that any argument for bl or any argument for bl is also an argument for bl V hr. 
However, there may be arguments for b, V bl which are neither arguments for hr 
nor bl. 
An allocation of support describes which arguments imply (hence support) a hypoth- 
esis. If some argument a proves to be true, then clearly all hypotheses b with CI < p( b) 
are necessarily proved to be true. However, in general nothing is known about which 
arguments are true or not. So, a body of arguments permits only hypothetical reasoning, 
that is the determination of arguments in favour of or against a hypothesis. 
The arguments against a hypothesis b are the arguments which support the com- 
plement or negation of b and are given by p(b”). The complement of this argument 
represents the arguments under which the hypothesis b is not excluded, remains possi- 
ble, even if not necessarily true. So the mapping 
z < . 49 d cd, <(b) := p’(b”) 
is called an ullowment oj’possibility. Arguments a such that a A t(b) # 1, or, equiv- 
alently, a 6 p(b”) may be called nondominated by p(bC). Whenever an argument a 
which is nondominated by p(b”) is true then b is possible. 
Conditions (1) (1’) and (2) of an allocation of support imply that an allowment of 
possibility < fulfills 
( 1) .;(l.) = pc(Ic) = p”(T) = TC = I, 
(1’) i(T) = pC(TC) = p’(I) = I’ = T, 
(2) <(h V h) = t(h) V t(b). 
The property (2) follows from DeMorgan’s laws 
<(b, v h2) = pc((b, ‘J b2)C) = ,d(b; A b;) 
= [p(b; ) A p(b;)lc = if(b;) v A%) 
= t(h) v t(b2 ). 
Property (2) implies monotonicity 
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(3) h db2 ===+ fz(h)<4(b2) 
and submultiplicativity 
(4) 5(bl A b2) d 4(h > A 5(b2). 
These properties, again, are easy to prove. bl dbz is, by definition, equivalent to 
62 = 6, V b2. Therefore, (2) implies <(b2) = <(bl V b2) = ((bl) V &b2) which is 
equivalent to r(bl)<<(bz), hence monotonicity (3). For any hypotheses bl, bz, we 
have 6, 2 bl A b2(i = 1,2). Therefore, monotonicity implies r(bi) 2 ((61 A b2) (i = 1,2) 
from which ((bl ) A Qb2) 3 l(bl A 62) follows immediately. 
A body of arguments may also equivalently be defined by means of an allowment 
of possibility i” instead of an allocation of support, the latter is determined by p(b) := 
5’(bc ). 
There are a number of important and interesting special cases of bodies of arguments, 
some of which shall be mentioned here: 
(i) If, in addition to conditions (1) and (2) of an allocation of support, one imposes 
Ah v b2) = dh 1 v Ah) 
then the allocation is called additive. In this case it follows easily that p(b) = r(b) for 
all 6. 
(ii) If, for all b E B, p(b) > I implies t(b) = T or, equivalently, t(b) < T implies 
p(b) = I, then the body of arguments is called consonant. The arguments are in this 
case consistent in the sense that if a hypothesis is supported by some argument, then 
its complement has no support. There are no arguments pointing into contradictory 
directions. 
(iii) Select a b’ E B, an a in & and define p(b) = a if b’db < T, p(T) = T and 
p(b) = I in all other cases. This is clearly an allocation of support, it is called a simpk 
support pointing to 6’. If a = T, then it is a deterministic support of 6’. In this case 
the body of arguments states that 6’ is necessarily true. If 6’ = T, then it is called 
the vacuous body of arguments, which supports in fact no hypothesis (except the sure 
one). 
Many times the information available concerns not the full algebra of hypotheses B 
but is restricted to a more limited question, hypotheses about which form a subalgebra 
$3’ of G??. Also the arguments allocated as support to hypotheses in BJ’ may well be all 
elements of a certain (complete) subalgebra JZZ’ of &‘, that is the image ~(59’) may be 
contained in &‘. Therefore, henceforth, in the following sections, allocations of support 
and allowments of possibility will be considered as mappings from some subalgebra 
@ of hypotheses into some subalgebra ~8 of arguments and the corresponding body 
of arguments (~8, B’, p) refers to those subalgebras. Everything stated above remains 
true relative to these subalgebras. 
1.2. Examples: construction of bodies of arguments 
It is worthwhile to sketch briefly a number of ways how bodies of arguments may 
arise in applications. 
J. Kohlas I Theoretical Cornpurer Science I71 i 1997) 221-246 227 
(a) Hints: multivalued mappings [4]. Information or knowledge relative to a question 
one is interested in, is often both uncertain and imprecise. It is uncertain because it may 
allow for several possible interpretations and it is not sure which one is the correct one. 
For example, if a sensor for a temperature produces a measurement, it may be assumed 
that the sensor works correctly (first possible interpretation of the measurement), but it 
is also possible that it is defective (second possible interpretation). The information is 
imprecise because, even if the correct interpretation would be known, this would not 
necessarily point to a precise answer but rather to a range of possible answers. For 
example, if the sensor is known to be defective, then all temperature values of a given 
range are possible 
In order to model such an uncertain and imprecise information, first the set of 
possible answers 0 to the question considered must be fixed. It is assumed that exactly 
one element of this set represents the correct, but unknown, answer to the question. 0 
is called the frame of discernment. The possible interpretations of the information form 
a second set Q. Again exactly one of its elements represents the correct (unknown) 
interpretation. Now, every possible interpretation CO E 9 restricts the possible answer 
to a subset T(W) of 0, the so-called focal set. This means that, if w happens to be the 
correct interpretation, then the correct answer to the question belongs necessarily to the 
subset T(o). The focal set may contain a single element. Then the interpretation fixes 
a precise answer. In general it is a proper subset of 0, but it may also well be equal 
to 0, in which case the interpretation carries no information whatsoever relative to the 
question considered (this would for example be the case for the defective sensor). The 
triple (0,O.f) is called a hint [16]. Let .d and .&’ be the fields of subsets, the power 
sets of B and 0, respectively, and define p(B) = {o E C! : T(o) C B} for any subset 
B C 0. It is easy to see that this p is an allocation of support and defines thus a body of 
arguments. It is equally easy to verify that in this case <(B) = {o E C? : r((ti)nB # 8) 
is the corresponding allowment of possibility. If all interpretations w with I = G? 
are eliminated, one obtains a normalized body of arguments. 
If in a body of arguments (.d,B,p) the algebras .d and .8 are ,finite, then it can 
in fact be shown that the allocation of support is necessarily generated by such a 
multivalued mapping. This is however no more the case if ,d or .&9 are not finite. 
(b) Generalized hints: filter-valued mappings 1111. The example above may be 
slightly generalized. To any w E Q associate a family f (0) of implied hypotheses 
(subsets) in 0, hypotheses which are necessarily true if (0 is the correct interpretation. 
For every w this family T(o) should satisfy the following conditions: 
(1) 0 E f(w) (the sure hypothesis is implied by every interpretation), 
(2) If B i B’ and B E T(W), then B’ E T(w) (every superset of an implied hypothesis 
is also implied), 
(3) If B, and B2 are in T(o), then B1 n B2 E r( co) (if two hypothesis are implied. 
then so is their intersection). 
Thus, r((ti) is for every possible interpretation w a ,filter of hypotheses. Let ,d and 
J as before be the fields of subsets of s2 and 0, respectively, and define this time 
p(B) = {w E Q : B E T(o)} for every B in .9. Again it is easy to see that p is 
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an allocation of support. To a filter T(o) of implied hypotheses associate the family 
of subsets {B 2 0 : BC @ T(o)}. These are the hypotheses which are possible under 
the interpretation w. The allowment of possibility associated with p is then given by 
t(B) = {c’, E Ll : Bc e T(o)}. Such systems are studied in detail in [ll, 151. 
(c) Bodies of arguments generated by propositional logic (121. Let _YA denote the 
set of well-formed formulae of a propositional logic over an alphabet A. It is well 
known that the set d of classes of equivalent formulas (a and b are equivalent if 
a H b is valid) forms a Boolean algebra (the Lindenbaum algebra [26]). If I%/ denotes 
the equivalence class of the formula CY, then the following identities hold: 
lal A IBI = ICI A PI, lal v IBI = Ia v PI> blC = I-4 
Consider now two alphabets A and B and the Lindenbaum algebras & and 98 of 
equivalent formulas in _YA and 9~. Let furthermore q be a formula from YA,,s, Iv] # 
1. If p is a formula from _!ZB define p(jpI) = v{/~l : GI A q /= /I}. Then it can again 
be shown that p is an allocation of support. It is in general nonnormalized, because 
some cx and q may be nonsatisfiable (contradictory) [12]. In this system q describes 
a knowledge base containing assumptions. The allocation of support describes under 
which assumptions hypothesis /3 can be derived from the knowledge q. Such systems 
are closely related to assumption based truth maintenance systems [3] and have been 
discussed by Laskey and Lehner [ 171, Provan [2 l] and Kohlas [ 121, Kohlas and Monney 
[14] in relation to evidence theory. They can be handled by methods from propositional 
logic such as resolution for example as has been shown in the references cited above. 
1.3. Combination of bodies of arguments 
Suppose that two bodies of arguments (di,*@i,pi) and (&~,%,Pz) are available. 
How can these two bodies be integrated and synthesized into a new, single body, 
enclosing the information of the two original bodies? This is the question discussed in 
this section. 
The basic idea is as follows: If ai is an argument in the first body of arguments 
which implies bl, and a2 is an argument in the second body which implies bz, then 
al A a2 surely should imply bl A bz. Therefore, if 61 A b2 d b, the combined argument 
al A a2 from the two bodies should imply b. Thus, if p(b) is the allocation of support 
of the combined bodies of arguments, then 
should hold. It seems reasonable to define p(b) as the smallest element of & domi- 
nating pl(bl) A pz(b2) whenever bl A b2 < 6. This leads to the following definition: 
p(b) = V{pi(br) A p2(bz) : h E gl,bz E B2,h A b2db). (1.1) 
Note that pl(bl) belongs to &i and pz(b2) to J& such that ,01(b1)Ap2(b2) belongs to 
the smallest (complete) subalgebra of CQZ containing both &‘i and ~‘2, and p(b) belongs 
also to this subalgebra. Let us denote this subalgebra by &i ~d2. Similarly, bl belongs 
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to %, and b2 to B2, such that bl A b2 is an element of the smallest subalgebra Bt V 12 
of A? containing both at and .S?s. Therefore, p(b) is at least defined for all elements 
of 99, V g2. Thus, p is a mapping from Bi V .%2 into &‘r V &I~. In order for the 
definition (1.1) to make sense it must be verified that p is indeed an allocation of 
support relative to %I V 6’2 and AZZ~ V ~2~. 
There is the possibility, that p,(bl) A pz(b2) = I for all 61 and 62. If this is the 
case, the two bodies of arguments are said to be not combinable. They are in fact 
completely contradictory in this case. 
Theorem 1.1. If the two bodies of urguments are combinable, then (1.1) defines un 
allocution qf support p : 9, V gl + a!1 V .d2 (in general nonnormalized). 
Proof. The proof depends on the associative and distributive laws for suprema and 
infinima over arbitrary families of elements, Lemma 1.1. In all formulae below it is 
understood that b, ranges over 99, and b2 over 92. 
(1) 
P(T) = V{pl(h) A ~2(b2) : h A b2 bT} 
= Vbl(h) A pdb2)) 
= (Vpl(h 1) A (Vp2(b2)) 
= PI(T) A /72(T) = T 
by properties ( I ) and (3) of an allocation of support. 
(2) For b’,b” E al V 932 it follows from the definition (1.1) 
p(b’ A b”) = v{p,(b,) A p2(b2) : bI A b2 <b’ A b”}, 
Note that {(b,,b2): b,Ab,Gb’Ab”} = {(b1,b2): b, = b’,Ab’,‘,b2 = b;Ab;;b,,b’,,b’,’ t 
21; bz,bi, by E 2~:: and b’, A 6; <b’, b’,’ A by < b”}. In fact, the second set is clearly 
enclosed in the first one. On the other hand, for b, A b2 <b’ A b”, take b/, = b/,’ = b, 
and hi = 6; = b2 such that b’, nb’,‘= b,, bi/\by = b2 and b’, r\bi = b, Ab2<b’. 
b’,’ A by = bl A b2 Gb” and it follows that the first set is also contained in the second 
one. 
It follows, using property (2) of an allocation of support, 
p(b’ A b”) = V{(p,(b:) A pz(b;)) A (pl(b’,‘) A pz(b;)) : b; A 6; d b’, b’,’ A b; d b”} 
= (V{pl(b’,) A p2(b:) : b: A b; db’}) 
A(V{p,(b’l’) A pz(b:‘) : b’,’ /\ b:‘<b”}) 
= p(b’) A p(b”). 
This proves the theorem. 0 
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There is a similar formula for the allowment of possibility. 
Theorem 1.2. The allowment of possibility 5 : Pi?, v 82 + d, V ~22 associated with 
the combined allocation of support is given by 
5(b) = A\(51(bl)v52(b2): 61 E Bl,b2 E g2,bl vb23b) (1.2) 
where i’, and 52 are the allowments of possibility associated with p1 and ~2, respec- 
tively and b E 971 V 992. 
Proof. In all formulae below it is understood that bl ranges over 931 and 62 over 3%. 
By definition and using the general, infinite version of the DeMorgan law, Lemma 1.1 
4(b) = PC(@) = (V{pi(bi) A pz(b2) : bl A h GbCl)C 
= A{(pl(h > A pdb2)Y :6, A b2 dbc} 
= l\{pF(b, > V p;(bz) : bl A b2 <b”} 
= A\(p;(bl) V p;(bz) : bf v b; 2b) 
=A{~,(bl)v42(b2): 61 Vbzab}. I7 
This combination of supports corresponds to the usual rule of Dempster [4] which 
originally was defined in the settings of multivalued mappings (see below). 
The combination operation will be denoted by $ such that the combined body 
of arguments which results from the combination of two bodies (&‘I, Wi, pi) and 
(d2, %, ~2) is denoted by (di V &2,% V 932, ~1 @ ~2). 
Theorem 1.3. The operation $ is commutative, associative and idempotent. 
Proof. The commutativity follows immediately from the commutativity of the meet in 
a Boolean algebra. 
To prove the associativity, let (di,gi,pi), i = 1,2,3 be three bodies of arguments. If 
b belongs to &?i V B2 V J!i93 (note that the associativity (@i V 9i&) Vi%?3 = 991 V (982 V ~83) 
is well known), then (using the distributive and associative laws, Lemma 1.1) 
(~1 @ ~2) @ m(b) = WI @ dh2) A m(h) 
: b,2 E g, V BL 63 E B3, b12 A b3 d bJ 
= V{(V{pl(h > A db2) 
: bl E 98ll,b2 E @2,b, A b:!<b,2}) 
/h(h) : bl2 E 81 v f-&b3 E %,b12 A b3 db} 
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= V{V{Pl(bl) A P2(b2) A Pdb3) 
: b, E :%,,bz E :S2,b1 A bZdb12} 
: b,z E 3, v 282, b3 E .g3, b12 A b3 <b} 
= V{pl(h > A pz(b2) A ~3(63) 
The last equality follows because bl A b2 <b ,2 and b,* A b3 <b is equivalent to 151 A 
b2 A b3<b. 
p I +3 (~2 @ p3 )( 6) leads, by a similar argument, to the same final formula. This proves 
the associativity of 8. 
Finally, if p : 39’ - d’ is an allocation of support and b belongs to A’, then by 
properties (2) and (3) of an allocation of support 
pGp(b)=V{p(b,)~p(b~) : b,,bl E .%t,b, A b2db} 
=V{p(b, A b2) : b,,bz E c%‘,b, A b2db} = p(b) 
because one may take 6, = 62 = b in the join. This proves the idempotency of @. [ ~- 
If one considers the set rD of all allocations of support relative to subalgebras d’ and 
:%I’ of the reference algebras d and S?, then this set becomes a commutative semigroup 
under the operation $, because the operation is associative by the theorem just proved. 
The subset @,d,,d, of all allocation of support relative to the fixed subalgebras .3’ 
and .%I’ is a subsemigroup and the vacuous allocation 181 on :??I’ is the identity in this 
subsemigroup as is asserted in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1.4. !f p : .%I’ -+ .d’ is un allocation of support, then 
p gi a&’ = p. 
Proof. Clearly, p 6? Z:/BI : SF -+ ,d’. Let then b belong to 9Y. By definition 
p @w(b)=V{p(b,) ~w(b2) : b,,b2 E 2?‘,b, A b2Gb) 
= V{p(b,) : 6, E %“,b, <b}. 
This is so because w(b2) = I unless b2 = T, in which case %.x<(T) = T. Furthermore, 
as b belongs to 2’ and p is monotone (property (3) of allocations of support), it follows 
that V{p(hl) : bl E A?, 61 db} = p(b), which proves the theorem. @ 
Depending on how bodies of arguments are constructed, specific ways to define 
their combination may be considered. It will be shown here that at least in the cases 
discussed above these ways lead to formula (1.1). This constitutes a further justification 
of this definition of combination. 
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(a) Hints: Let (a,, O,r,) and (02, O,Tz) be two different hints (with different sets 
of interpretations 01 and !&) but bearing on the same unknown element 8 E 0. In both 
hints there must be a correct interpretation 01 E 01 and w2 E Szz and if (~1~~2) is 
the correct combined interpretation, then the unknown element must surely be both in 
Tl(wl) and rz(wz), hence in the intersection T(o~,o~) = r1(0~1)nr2(~)2) of the focal 
sets. This shows that the two hints can be synthetisized into the new combined hint 
(sZ1 x Q2, 0, r). This hint may be normalized by eliminating all (01, ~2) E 521 x fi2 
for which T(OI,OZ) = Tl(ol) r? r2(02) = 0, because they are clearly impossible 
combinations. This is how Dempster [4] defined the combination of hints. 
The combined hint induces then an allocation of support 
It is not difficult to show that this set of interpretations equals also 
U ({(w1>~2) : ~I(Q)CBI} r‘l {(w,~2) : r2(~2)C(Bz))) 
B,nBz CB 
= U (PIMPS). (1.3) 
B,nB> & I3 
Here p1 and p2 have been in a natural way extended from the fields of subsets of 
521 or s22 respectively to the field of subsets of sZ1 x Q2. (1.3) is then the equivalent 
to ( 1.1) for this particular case of bodies of arguments. 
This analysis can also be extended to generalized hints (see example (b) in 
Section 1.2 [l 11). 
(b) Assumption-based reasoning: Consider example (c) of Section 1.2 and let ye, 
and ~2 represent two knowledge bases with the associated allocations of support p1 
and ~2. The two knowledge bases may be combined into a single knowledge base 
v = ~1 A y2 which induces its own allocation of support. More precisely, suppose y1 
and yl2 are assumption-based knowledge bases belonging to the propositional languages 
YA,“B~ and 9A2U~2r respectively. Consider the Lindenbaum algebras .&I, d2 for the 
assumptions expressed by propositional formulae over the alphabets A1 and Al, and 
the Lindenbaum algebras 981 and 982 for the hypotheses expressed by propositional 
formulae over the alphabets B1 and B2. The two knowledge bases y1 and y2 induce 
then two bodies of arguments (~21, &II, ~1) and (XI,, 992, ~2). The combined knowledge 
base ~1/\~2 defines a body of arguments (&I Vd2,3?~ V282, p), because the Lindenbaum 
algebras of the propositional languages over alphabets Al UA2 and B1 UBZ are &I V zd2 
and 981 V gz, respectively. It has been shown in [ 12,153 that p = pi @ ~2. 
1.4. Marginalization and extension 
Consider a body of arguments (JZZ”, a’, p). It may be desirable to simplify the analysis 
by restricting the focus to a subalgebra /?8” of &?‘. This means that only a subset of 
hypotheses is considered. It may also be desirable to coarsen the arguments considered, 
by restricting arguments to elements of a (complete) subalgebra JZP’ of J&. This means, 
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for the sake of simplicity for example, to neglect finer arguments than those in .d”. 
How can the body of arguments be coarsed in this way? 
If all arguments in ,d’ remain available, then limiting attention to the subalgebra 
.&” means simply restricting the mapping p to a”. Coarsening of arguments is a little 
bit more involved. The key to it is the observation that any argument a <p( h) is an 
argument supporting b. Hence, if only arguments in the complete subalgebra &’ are 
allowed, then the supremum of all supporting arguments in .,/” represents the support 
of h in ~8’. Therefore, for all b belonging to ,%“, define 
[P”qh) = V{u : a E .d”,a<p(b)}. b E .@“. (1.4) 
This is again an allocation of support as the following theorem shows. 
Theore,,, 1.5. p”.“/“, 8”) : #’ + A& is un allocation of‘ support. It is normalixd if’ 
p is ,so. 
Proof. By definition and property (1) of an allocation of support 
,$(.d”..l”) T _ ( ) - v{a : a E d”,a<p(T)} = T. 
Again by definition and by property (2) of allocations of support, for br , b2 belonging 
to W, we have 
pJc@“‘.““(6r A b2) = V{u : a E .a/“,a<p(br A h2) = p(br) A p(h2)). 
The two sets {a: uEd”,a~p(bl)Ap(bz)} and {u: a=a~Aa~;al,u2~.~“,u~bp(h~). 
a? <p(b~)} are identical. In fact, the second is clearly contained in the first one. The 
reverse is also true as can be seen by taking at = u2 = a. Hence, by the distributive 
law, Lemma 1.1, it follows that 
plCq/“. d”‘(h, A b2) = V{q A u2 : uj,a2 E -d’,u~ dp(h),a2dp(b)} 
= (V{u, : Ul G af”,u, <p(h ,>) 
w/{az : 02 E &“,a? dp(h2,), 
_ l(d”, qb,) * plw”..q~2), 
This proves that Q~(,~“~,“‘) IS indeed an allocation of support. 
Finally, if p is normalized, 
pl@, ““J(l) = V{u : a E .d”,u<P(I) = 1-} = 1. 
This proves the theorem. C 
The allocation of support pl(.d”.J”) 1s called the marginalization (or projection) of 
p to X2”, 3”. The marginalization can, by de Morgans law (Lemma 1.1) readily be 
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expressed also in terms of allowments of possibility. If b belongs to B”, then 
(i(.d”, ““)(b) = (p&d”, %"'(bC))" 
=(V{a : a E d”,a<p(bC)})C = /\{d : a E d”,u<p(bC)} 
= A{u : a E d”,a”dp(b”)} = A{u : a E d”,u>~(b)}. 
This operation can again be illustrated by the two examples of hints and assumption- 
based knowledge bases. 
(a) Hints. Consider a hint (Sz, 0, r), where this time the frame 0 is assumed to be 
a product set 01 x Oz. If only the (unknown) answer in the factor set 0, is of interest, 
then this corresponds to a marginalization of the allocation of support induced by the 
hint to the field of subsets of the set 01. It is easy to see that this same marginalized 
allocation of support is obtained by taking as ri (0) the projection of the set T(o) to 
the factor 01 and considering the hint (Q, 01, rl). The allocation of support induced 
by this hint equals the marginalization of the original allocation of support. 
In this example only the algebra of hypotheses was coarsened. But one may want 
to simplify the analysis by grouping interpretations together into aggregated interpre- 
tations. This grouping defines a partition of 0, which in turn defines a subalgebra AZ?’ 
of the power set of Sz, the algebra of all subsets which are unions of elements of the 
partition. This coarsening of the available information corresponds to a marginalization 
of the allocation of support of the original hint to the subalgebra &“. The same result 
can be obtained, if Sz is replaced by the set 52’ of the elements w’ of the partition and 
T’(w’) is defined as the union of the T(o) over all w in 52’. 
More general ways of coarsening of hints are discussed in [22]. 
(b) Assumption-based reasoning. Suppose q is a knowledge base in the propositional 
language over the alphabet A U B. Consider a subalphabet A’ U B’, with A’ CA and 
B’ C B and suppose we are only interested in hypotheses which can be expressed in 
the language 9~1 and we want only to consider assumptions expressed in 9~1. This 
corresponds to a marginalization of the allocation of support induced by ye to the 
Lindenbaum algebras of the languages 9~1 and .9s1. For a discussion of this we refer 
to [12]. 
If a body of arguments (&‘,#,p) is given, then sometimes one would like to 
extend it to a superalgebra 39” of @. This can be done by combining the allocation 
of support p on 99’ with the vacuous support 2911 on 99”. The result is an allocation 
of support p e3 2,#/, : @’ -+ d’, where no information has been added to p. In fact, for 
b belonging to @, by the definition (1 .l ) of combination 
p ~z.~fl(b)=V{p(b,)/\za//(bz): bl E c%T’,bz E @‘,bl A bzdb} 
= V{p(h > : bl E B’, b, db} 
as z~ft(b2)=1 unless b2 = T, in which case QU(T)=T. So the support of a hypothesis 
b belonging to a” is the supremum of the supports of all b belonging to G!?’ which 
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imply h. That is indeed what one expects to be the extension of the allocation of 
support from .SI’ to :a”. 
Furthermore, an allocation of support with arguments in an algebra d’ is also an 
allocation of support in a (complete) superalgebra ~8’ of XI’. Therefore, we define the 
I~UUKIUS extensions of an allocation of support p : 2’ + .d’ to ~9” and ~8 by 
P T( 4’. 8” ) = p L$ 1 d,, : 2” + ,$f”, (1.5) 
Clearly, this is still an allocation of support by Theorem 1 .l, because it is the 
combination of two allocations of support. The associated allowment of possibility 
can, by de Morgans law (Lemma 1 .l), be obtained as 
p”“.+qh) = A{((b,) : 6, E Af,h, >h}. 
When one extends an allocation of support and marginalizes it back to the original 
algebras, one would expect to find the original allocation of support. 
Theorem 1.6. Zf p : 9' + ~2' is an allocation of .support, and .G&‘, 8” are superol- 
yehvas qf‘ .d’, 9’ respectively, then 
(pT(.C~“..~“,)i(.~‘.~‘) = p, 
Proof. If h belongs to #, then by definition 
($(.‘J”. iR”))i(.“/‘. 8’) (b) = V{a’ : a’ E &‘,a’<p(b)} 
because pT(.‘““,““)(6) = p(b) if b belongs to 8’. But p(b) belongs itself to .d’ such 
that V{a’ : a’ E .d’,a’<p(b)} = p(b). This proves the theorem. CZ 
The vacuous extension of a marginalization on the other hand does in general not 
reconstruct the original allocation of support. Thus, if /, : .‘A’ - .d’ and &“I. &’ arc 
subalgebras of .d’ and A?’ respectively, then, in general 
(pl(~/“.;R”,)r(.:~‘.?A’) f p, 
By the marginalization there is in general a loss of information. If nevertheless 
equality holds above, that is, if no information is lost by marginalization, then the 
body of arguments is said to be carried by (~s#‘,~“). It is then of course sufficient 
to know the allocation of support on Y”, the allocation of support on 28’ can be 
reconstructed by vacuous extension. 
The idea of vacuous extension can again be illustrated by our examples. 
(a) Hints. Consider a hint (Q Ot,r1) and form the product set 0 = 01 x 02. The 
hint (Q, 01, rl) induces an allocation of support relative to the power set of 01. This 
is a subfield of (or isomorphic to) the power set of 0. Hence, the allocation can be 
vacuously extended to the power set of 0 by the definition given above. It is easy to 
see that the same result can be obtained by defining T(o) = T)(w) x 02 (the cylinder 
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set over r,(w)) and considering the hint (a, 0, r). The allocation of support it induces 
equals the vacuous extension of the allocation of support of the hint (Q 01, rr ). 
(b) Assumption-based reasoning. If r is an assumption-based knowledge base in a 
propositional language _YAU~, then it defines an allocation of support relative to the 
Lindebaum algebras of 9~ and 9~. If one is interested in hypotheses expressed in 
some propositional language 9~’ were B C B’, then the allocation of support can be 
vacuously extended to 9~‘. This is the same as the allocation of support induced by 
q, if q is this time considered as a formula in _.YA~BJ. 
2. Bodies of evidence 
2.1. Support and plausibility functions 
A body of arguments (s&“,@, p) in itself does not yet let us establish which hy- 
potheses are true, because it is unknown which arguments in &’ hold. If it would 
become known that a certain argument a E ~2’ is true, then clearly all b E &I’ with 
a d p(b) must necessarily also be true. As an intermediate stage between knowing noth- 
ing about which arguments are true and knowing that a certain specified argument is 
true, one might assume that a probability measure indicating the likelihood of at least 
some arguments to be true, is given. The combination of a body of arguments together 
with a probability measure on & will be called a body of evidence. 
More precisely, let &‘s be a subalgebra of & which is assumed to be a o-algebra, 
that is suprema and infima of countable families of elements of do are also in do. 
Let p be a probability measure on &s (a normalized measure in the terminology of 
Halmos [S]). With these elements one can measure how probable it is that b can be 
derived (proved) using the body of arguments. At least this is the case for some b E 93. 
Define 
v(b) = /O(b)) (2.1) 
if p(b) E do. sp(b) is called the degree of support of b (relative to a body of evidence). 
It measures the degree to which b is supported by the body of evidence. Similarly, one 
can measure how likely it is that b is not excluded by the body of arguments. Define 
pi(b) = At(b)) (2.2) 
if r(b) E do. pi(b) is called the degree of plausibility of b (relative to a body of 
evidence). It measures to what degree b is plausible in the light of the body of evidence. 
The degrees of support and of plausibility are not necessarily defined by (2.1) and 
(2.2) for all hypotheses b E 23. In the next section it will however be shown how this 
deficiency can be removed. For the time being let ~9~ = {b E 99’ : p(b) E &‘o} and &P = 
{b E g’ : c(b) E do}. 6, and gP are called the sets of s- andp-measurable hypotheses. 
It follows from property (2) of p or 5, respectively, that 6, is a multiplicative class (a 
class closed under meet), &P an additive class (a class closed under join). T belongs 
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always to 6, and so does I, if p is normalized; on the other hand 1 belongs always 
to dP, but T only if p is normalized. sp and pl can be considered as functions from 
6, and gP to [0, l] and as such are called support and plausihilit,y functions. 
If p is not normalized, then p(l) represents contradictory arguments. It can be 
argued, that those arguments cannot be true, because i is known not to be true. This 
implies that these arguments should be removed from ,&, i.e. the normalized body of 
arguments (.c& A p’(L),&, p A p’(l)) should be considered (see Section 1 .l ). At the 
same time, the probability measure p can also be conditioned on the information pc( L) : 
.d~ A p’(L) is still a o-algebra and p’(a) = u*(a)/u*(p’(i)) is a probability measure 
on .da A p’(l), if ,u* is the outer measure of I_I [ 181. In this way any body of evidence 
can be transformed into a normalized one by conditioning on the possible arguments 
provided p*(p”(-L)) > 0. The corresponding support and plausibility functions are 
sometimes called proper support and plausibility functions. 
It is however convenient to continue to consider general, possibly nonnormalized 
bodies of evidence. The following theorem summarizes the main properties of support 
and plausibility functions. 
Theorem 2.1. Support functions b,Y ---* [0, l] and plausibility functions 6 ,, --i [0, I 1 
hure the ,jollolving properties 
(1) sp(T) = I, pl(l_) = 0 
( 1’) sp(l) = 0, pi(T) = 1 in the case of normulized bodies, 
(2) sp(b) = 1 - pl(bC), pi(b) = 1 -- sp(bC), 
(2’) sp(h)< pi(h) in the case of normalized bodies, 
(3) monotonicity of order x : if 61, b2,. . . , b, d h, cl11 in (5”,, n 3 I, then 
v(b)aC (-l)‘t’+‘sp :0 # rc{l,.,,,n} 
and alternance of order CC: if hi, bl, . , h, 2 h, all in 8,. n 2 1, then 
pl(b)SC C-1) { ltl+‘pl(ytbl) :0#IG{l,...,n}}. 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
Proof. (I), (1’) (2) and (2’) follow immediately from the definitions. (2.3) follows 
from p(b) >, p(bl V V 6,) > p(bl ) V V p(b,) and the inclusion-exclusion formula 
of probability theory (see [7]). (2.4) follows from (2.3) by the relation (2). 
Set functions like sp having properties (l), (1’). (2) and (3) of the previous theorem 
were called belief functions by Shafer [22,23]. In this sense the theory developed here 
qualifies as a Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. 
Two special cases deserve special attention: 
(i) If the allocation of support is udditizje, then &$ and c$, are identical and form a 
Boolean algebra. Because in this case p = 5 it follows that sp =pl. This in turn implies 
that there is equality in (2.3) and (2.4) if V, b, = h or r\, b, = b. Thus, sp =pl defines 
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an additive measure on &YS = gPp, that is essentially a probability measure (although in 
general there is only finite additivity). 
(ii) If the allocation of support is consonant, than clearly sp(b) > 0 + pf(b) = 1 
or pi(b) < 1 + sp(b) = 0. sp and pl are in this case necessity and possibility measures 
respectively as studied in possibility theory [5]. 
The question arises whether any function sp from a multiplicative class 8, in a 
Boolean algebra to [0, 11, which satisfies properties (1) and (3) is generated by a body 
of evidence. In case gS is a multiplicative class of subsets of some set, it has been 
shown that sp is generated by a generalized hint [23, 11, 121. 
It may be helpful to illustrate these notions through the examples of hints and 
assumption-based knowledge bases. 
(a) Hints. The best known case of evidence theory is the one of hints (a, 0, I-) with 
finite set Q of interpretations and finite frame 0. In this case a probability measure 
can be defined on the field of subsets of Q by specifying probabilities p(w) 3 0 for all 
o in 52, such that C wEB p(w) = 1. In this case the basic probability numbers 
are then usually introduced. The collection of basic probability numbers m(B) for all 
subsets B of 0 is called basic probability assignment (bpa). It turns out that sp and 
pl are defined on the whole field of subsets of 0 which is of course very satisfactory. 
The well-known formulae 
pi(B) = c m(A) for BC 0 
AnB#0 
result. It is also possible to obtain the bpa from sp or pl by Mobius transforms (see 
[22]). Note however that in the case of general hints (nonfinite set of interpretations 
and frame) in general a bpa does not exist, just as in probability theory in general 
densities do not exist (neither discrete nor continuous ones). And also in the general 
case one may not expect the support and plausibility to be defined at the outset for all 
subsets of 0 by (2.1) and (2.2). 
(b) Assumption-based reasoning. If q is an assumption-based knowledge base in a 
language -(i4,&,B, then this structure becomes a body of evidence, if probabilities are 
assigned to the assumptions. Usually, stochastically independent assumptions aj E A 
are assumed [12, 141. The support function is usually not determined explicitly. Rather, 
for each particular hypothesis /? to be considered, the probability p(p(p)) = sp(B) 
is computed. Remark that the element p(p) of the Lindenbaum algebra of _YA can 
be represented by any formula of 9~ which belongs to the equivalence class p(B). 
Thus, essentially, the problem here is to compute the probability of a propositional 
formula, a problem well known in reliability theory. Indeed, probabilistic assumption- 
based reasoning is a theory of reliability of reasoning. For details see [14]. 
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2.2. Allocation and allowment of probability 
It is unsatisfactory that only certain hypotheses in 99’ have a degree of support or 
of plausibility, depending on p and especially on the o-algebra do. It will be shown 
in this section that this is only superficially so. In fact, it is possible to associate with 
every b in .d’ a natural degree of support and of plausibility. 
Let .fo be the c-ideal of the p-null sets in _CZJO and J’!O = J~o/J’~ the quotient 
algebra of all equivalence classes (a’ N a” off a’ - a” E ,fo and a” - a’ E Yo). If [a] 
denotes the equivalence class of the element a, then [li]’ = [aC] and 
V{[a,] : i = 1,. ..} = [V{a, : i = 1,. .}], 
A{ [ai] : i = 1,. .} = [l\{a, : i = 1,. . .}]. 
h(a) = [a] is therefore a o-homomorphism from .do onto .Ko, called the projection. 
Furthermore by v([a]) = p(a) a normalized, positive measure \’ is defined on .&‘cI (that 
is ~([a]) > 0 if [a] # I). Thus, (J&‘o,v) is a measure algebra [8] and therefore ,,&‘o 
is a complete algebra, which satisfies the so-called countable chain condition [8]. That 
is, every family of disjoint elements of ~4’0 is countable. 
Define for every a E .i$ 
PO(a) = V{[a’] : a’fa,a’ E ~~20). 
This is a well-defined element of _Mo because of the completeness of the latter. The 
following theorem has been proved by Kohlas [13]. 
Theorem 2.2. po : d + A’0 is a normalized allocation of support. In j&ct it is g- 
complete, that is condition (2) for allocations of support holds even for countable 
families: 
= ,r, po(ai). 
Now, the allocations of support p : A?’ + .d’ and po : .d 4 .A0 can be chained to 
71 = po o p : .9’ -+ J&‘o. 7c is clearly still an allocation of support and it allocates to 
every hypothesis b in 4?’ an element of the probability algebra A’o. Such an allocation 
of support in a measure algebra will be called an allocation of probability [23]. The 
allocation of probability n is normalized iff the allocation of support p is normalized. 
There is of course a dual definition for the allowment of possibility. q = 40 o < : 
.4’ -+ . HO is the dual allowment of possibility associated with x, if 50 is the allowment 
of possibility corresponding to PO. An allowment of possibility in a measure algebra 
will be called allowment of probability [23]. Note that, for b E A?, q(b) = <0(<(b)) = 
<o(pC(bC)) = (poMbC))C = +(bC). 
It becomes now possible, to define the degree of support and the degree of plausi- 
bility for CWQJ hypothesis b in 99’: 
v,(b) = v($b)), p/,(b) = v(v(b)). (2.5) 
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For every b E 6, there is equality between sp(b) and sp,(b), sp(b) = sp,(b), just 
as p/(b) = pi,(b) for every b E 8,. This is so because, for b E gS,, v(n(b)) = 
Qo(db))) = v(b(b)l) = Mb)), as pa(a) = [a] whenever a E ~~20. Clearly, sp, 
and pie are support and plausibility functions enjoying the properties of Theorem 2.1. 
They are extensions of the support and plausibility functions sp and pl from &s or d,, 
respectively, to 8’. Note that there may be several extensions of support and plau- 
sibility functions [23] and only one of them is determined by the body of evidence. 
Different bodies of evidence may induce the same support and plausibility functions 
sp and pl, but different extensions sp, and pl, [15]. 
Note that in the examples of hints with finite set of interpretations and finite frame, as 
discussed at the end of the previous section, the allocation of support and of probability 
coincide. As a consequence no extension of the support and plausibility function is 
necessary. The same is true for the case of assumption-based reasoning. As has been 
noted however, this simple situation can not be maintained in the general case, for 
example, for hints with nonfinite sets of interpretations and frames. 
Because allocations and allowments of probability are at the same time allocations of 
support or allowments of possibility, the discussion and the results of Section 1 apply 
also to them. In particular, allocations of probability can be combined (see the following 
section), they can be marginalized and vacuously extended. In fact, if n : 2’ --t ~2’0 is 
an allocation of probability, and 98” a subalgebra of g’, then the marginalization of n 
to 9??’ is simply the restriction of rc to .W, that is, for b belonging to @’ 
d”“(b) = z(b). 
#‘” : B” --+ Alo is of course still an allocation of probability, and in fact r# = 
PiW opo. To this marginalization corresponds also a marginalization of the support and 
plausibility functions induced by z to .@“. It follows from (2.5) and the marginalization 
of the allocation of probability, that the marginalizations of support and plausibility 
functions correspond also simply to the restriction of these functions to 98”. That is, 
for b belonging to W, 
sp,/“(b) = sp,(b), pZ,“@‘(b) = pi,(b). 
Just as there is a vacuous allocation of support on an algebra #, there is also a 
wcuous allocation of probability mg” = ~0 0 a~~~. It allocates the whole probability 
mass to T and no probability to any other hypothesis. Then, the vacuous extension of 
an allocation of probability n : 93’ --) A0 to some superalgebra 4?” of 69’ is defined 
by 
7Ltg” = rr,@ rLn2$#/,_ 
For a b belonging to #’ this gives by the definition (1.1) of allocations of support, in 
analogy to the corresponding formula for allocations of support, 
d%“(b) = V{n(bl) : b, E 99’,bl db}. 
It will be shown in the following section that also nT@“’ = pa o pf8”. 
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The following theorem shows how the corresponding support and plausibility func- 
tions can be vacuously extended. 
Theorem 2.3. Let sp, and pl, be the support and plausihilit~~ functions induced h> 
an allocation of probability x : :%!’ --f ./lo, 29” a superulgebru (?f’.#‘, and spur “’ und 
pl r fl” 
(’ the support and plausibility jtinctions of the ~:ucuou.s extension rcT ‘“. Thtx, 
,fiw h helonginy to .~%I” 
= sup Biic$ ,,,, /-l)“‘+‘~p? (Abz) : b, E .%‘,b,<b,i= l,..., n;n>l . 
> In IEl _ 
PI, 
t “l’(h) 
= inf H/1=$ i(-l)“‘+‘pl, ( Vbi> : b, E B’,b,>b,i = l,..., n;n> I 
1 ,n iE1 _ 
Proof. Consider, for b belonging to 9”, the family 2(b) of joins m = V,_,, ,,,, .$b, ), 
where 6, E A?, b, < b, i = 1,. . . , n. If nz’ and m” belong to f(b), then m’ V m” belongs 
clearly also to 2(b). This means that y(b) is an upward net (an upward net is a 
family of elements m such that, if m’ and m” belongs to the family, there is always an 
element m am’ V m” in the family). If m belongs to &(b), then clearly m < n1 “‘. hence 
V n1t,Y(h)m~= T”’ On the other hand, the set {n(bl) : bl E @,bl bb} is a subset of 
f(b), such that VmE Y(bj m axT2”, hence V,,,tfP(hj m = nT “I. This implies now 
speT”‘(b) = v(nT.“‘(b)) = v 
The last equality holds for upward nets (see [23] or also [13]). Furthermore, according 
to the inclusion-exclusion formula of probability theory [7] 
= C (-l)“‘+‘~ 
@#I c_{ t. . . ..n} 
= c (_l)lfl+‘,, 
Infl C{ I,....n} cn (abJ) 
=cn#,Gz ,,, )(4ri+i,p, (/Is). 
> .n lEl 
This proves the first part of the theorem. 
The second part of the theorem follows from pl,T@‘(b) = 1 - speT”‘(b’). / I 
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The right-hand side of the formula for speTB”(b) in the theorem has been called the 
canonical extension of sp, by Shafer [23]. Among all support functions (i.e. functions 
satisfying (2.3)) on ~$9” which are extensions of sp, it is the smallest one. The theorem 
shows then that the canonical extension of a support function is indeed the support 
function of the vacuous extension of the inducing body of evidence. An analogous 
result holds with respect to the plausibility function. 
2.3. Combining bodies of evidence 
Consider two bodies of arguments (dt,&J,,pi) and (&2,&p2). Furthermore, let 
&a be a a-subalgebra of JZ! and ,u a probability measure on ~~20 such that we have 
two bodies of evidence. The problem addressed in this section is how to derive the 
combined body of evidence from these two bodies. 
The way to combine two (or more) bodies of evidence is clear: First the bodies of 
arguments are combined and then support and plausibility functions are derived relative 
to the combined bodies of evidence. However, a moment’s notice shows that there 
are two presumably equivalent ways to do this: Either the two bodies (,c4i,99t,pr) 
and (~22,992, ~2) are first combined and then the allocation of probability relative 
to the combined body is derived. Or else, the two allocations of probability derived 
individually for each body of evidence are combined (see Fig. 1). 
Presumably, these two methods of combination should yield the same result. This is 
indeed true, because poo(pt @p2) = (psopi)$(paop2) = ni $712. For a proof of this 
result see [ 131. In particular, it follows that rcTa” = n 8 rrz~ = (PO o p) @ (pa o 2~) = 
pa 0 (p $ zag”) = pa 0 $a”, as has been mentioned in the previous section. 
According to (1 .I) of Section 1.3, the combined allocation of probability rr of rr1 
and 712 is, for b belonging to @t V &?2, defined by 
n(b) = V{z1(b,) A x2(h) : 61 E Bl,bz E %, 61 A b2 66). 
Similarly, the combined allowment of probability q is according to Theorem 1.2, 
Section 1.3 
v(b) = A{m(h) v vdb2) : h E gi,bz E %,h v h>b). 
This permits then to determine the degrees of support and plausibility relative to the 
combined body of evidence. 
There is the important special case of independent bodies of evidence. The notion of 
independence can already be defined for bodies of arguments. Two bodies of arguments 
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(d1,.%,, ~1) and (&, gz, ~2) are called independent, if -c4t and .tiz are independent 
Boolean subalgebras, that is, if at A a2 # I, whenever at E ,cyll and a2 E .&‘I (there 
are other notions of independence, for example related to the independence of the 
algebras of hypotheses, but here only the notion of “argument” independence will be 
considered). If now, furthermore, &o is a o-subalgebra of .d and P a probability 
measure on ~~20, then the two bodies of arguments become two bodies of evidence. 
Clearly, cd0 n .dl and ~40 n at’2 become independent o-subalgebras of .do. If there 
are probability measures PI and P2 on ~!a n .&‘I and ~40 n .dz, respectively, such 
that the restriction of P to (~2~ n dcpI ) v (do n sd2) is the product measure, P = 
PlP2, then the two bodies of evidence are called independent. This is the case usually 
considered in evidence theory; in particular, when Dempster’s rule of combination is 
discussed. 
In this case, the support and plausibility functions of the combined bodies can be 
computed from the support and plausibility functions of the individual bodies. 
Theorem 2.4. If sp,l, sp,~ and pl,, , pl,, are the support und plausibility functions of’ 
two independent bodies of evidence then the support and plausibility functions of thr 
combined body of evidence are given by 
SP,(b) = sup 
i 
~fl CX, ,,, 
3 ,n 
~ (-1 )“‘+‘sP,, (hblJ sPe2 ($bzJ} 
where the supremum is to be taken over alljinite sets qf bl,, bl, E 69, i
such that bl, A b2i <b, and 
pi,(b) = inf 
(2.6) 
I )...) n,n>l, 
(2.7) 
where the iqjimum is to be taken over all jinite sets of bl,, bzi E 3, i = 1~. , n, n 3 l( 
such that 61, V bZ,3 b. 
Proof. In general, consider finite sets of elements bli, 62, E W, i = 1,. . . , n 3 1 such that 
bli A bzi < b and the corresponding suprema m = V,z,,,,,,n(7rl(bl,) A x2(b2,)). The family 
y(b) of these suprema is an upward net. In fact, if m’ = Vi,-,,(xl(blL) A nz(bz,)) and 
m” = V,,,,,(nl(bli) A nz(b2i)), then it follows that m = V,E,,U,,,(~l(b~r) A nz(bZi)) = 
m’ V m” which is also a member of the family. We have 
n(b) = V m, 
mE f(b) 
because every upper bound of all the xl(bl) A nz(bz) with bl A bZ<b is also an 
upper bound of all m and vice versa. It follows therefore, because of the equality 
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V(Vm&f?(b) m) = sUPmEg v(m) for upward nets [23,131, that 
sp,(b) = sup v(m) 
mE/(b) 
= sup c (-lp+lv ~2Cb2i)) 
0+J c { I ,...,n} 
= sup 
OjJ~&..}(-l)‘J’+l , 1 
+  (pi) A7c2 (p))}. 
where the supremum is to be taken over the above specified sets. In the case of indepen- 
dent bodies of evidence v(zl(bl)A nz(b2)) = v(~~~(bl))v(z~(b~)) = sp,,(bl)sp,,(b2). If 
this is introduced in the last formula above one obtains (2.6). (2.7) is proved similarly 
or follows from p/,(b) = 1 - sp,(bC). 0 
Independent bodies of evidence arise especially in the case of hints. 
Hints. If (Szi, 0, ri) and (a,, @, r2) are two hints, then the combined hint has the 
product set fir x s22 of combined interpretations. It is then usually assumed that the 
interpretations of the two hints are stochastically independent. The probability measure 
constructed on Qi x s22 is thus the product measure of the two probability measures 
PI and P2 of the individual hints, 
In the case of finite sets of interpretations and of finite frames, this case leads to 
the usual rule of Dempster for combination as defined for example in [4] or [22]. This 
is thus a special case of the more general combination rules discussed in this paper. 
Often Dempster’s rule is expressed in terms of the bpa’s of the two hints. However, 
as already mentioned, in the general case bpa’s do not exist. 
Note that in the case of assumption-based knowledge bases the property of inde- 
pendence between bodies of evidence does not hold in general, because the same 
assumptions may be present in two or more knowledge bases which have to be com- 
bined. And this destroys independence. Thus, the generalization of Dempster’s rule is 
not void of interest. 
3. Conclusion 
Evidence theory is here presented as a theory of reasoning with uncertain arguments. 
Allocations of support define arguments which imply hypotheses. If the likelihood of 
these arguments can be measured by probabilities, then degrees of support and of 
plausibility can be assigned to hypotheses. These support and plausibility functions 
turn out to be set functions, monotone or alternating of infinite order. This qualifies 
this evidence theory as a Dempster-Shafer theory. 
An important problem is the combination of bodies of arguments and of bodies of 
evidence. The basic principle of this combination is a generalization of Dempster’s 
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rule. Related to this question of combination are notions of independence of bodies of 
arguments and of evidence. This very important notion and the problems related to it 
have only been touched upon in this paper. It deserves however much more profound 
study. 
Argument-based reasoning is proposed as a very powerful paradigm which very 
naturally leads to a new synthesis and integration of probability and logic (see, for 
example [ 11). It offers a unifying approach which is able to cover such apparently 
divers fields as statistical inference and logic based argumentation systems [ 161. 
Argument systems have also been studied by other authors [2,6]. However these 
approaches are not related to Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence and to the integration 
of probability into a logical framework. 
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